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Despite having endured significant terrorist incidents over the past 50
years, terrorism-specific offenses were not criminalized in Canada until the
implementation of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) in 2001. One of the
primary goals of this legislation was to provide law enforcement with the
tools necessary to proactively prevent terrorist incidents; however, the
effectiveness of these new legal measures in preventing terrorist incidents,
and the potential for the increased punishment of offenders sanctioned
under them, remains unclear. Using a sample of convicted terrorist
offenders (n = 153) from the Officially Adjudicated Terrorists in Canada
(OATC) dataset, the current study investigates variability in the sentencing
outcomes of offenders sanctioned in Canada between 1963 and 2010. The
findings indicate that offenders were significantly less likely to successfully
complete an offense following the implementation of the ATA; however,
offenders previously convicted of general Criminal Code offenses were
sanctioned more harshly than those convicted of terrorism-specific offenses
alone. Furthermore, changes in the legal processing, and demographic
structure, of terrorist offenders are uncovered as the findings highlight how
changing contextual environments impact the sentencing outcomes of
terrorist offenders.
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INTRODUCTION
When contrasted to countries such as Ireland or Spain, Canada’s
experience with terrorist incidents is comparatively limited.1 Despite this,
Canada has endured ongoing terrorist campaigns,2 witnessed the first
1

See David A. Charters, The (Un)Peaceable Kingdom? Terrorism and Canada Before
9/11, 9 INST. FOR RES. ON PUB. POL’Y 1, 8 (2008) [hereinafter Charters 1] (noting that, in
general, the terrorist events experienced in Canada have been less in frequency and severity
than those experienced by other countries); see also Ronald Crelinsten, Canada’s Experience
With Terrorism and Violent Extremism, in TERROR IN THE PEACEABLE KINGDOM:
UNDERSTANDING AND ADDRESSING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN CANADA, 9, 22–23 (David
Garenstein-Ross & Linda Frum eds., 2012) [hereinafter Crelinsten 1] (detailing the domestic,
international, and transnational terrorist incidents that have occurred in Canada over the past
century).
2
These terrorist campaigns include the SOF Doukhobors and the Front de Liberation du
Quebec. The Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) is the most significant terrorist campaign
in Canadian history. Charters 1, supra note 1, at 16. With the objective of obtaining
independence for Quebec, the campaign was active from 1963 to 1972. David A. Charters,
The Amateur Revolutionaries: A Reassessment of the FLQ, 9 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE
133, 138–140 (1997) [hereinafter Charters 2] (addressing the fluid membership structure of
the FLQ, as well as the organizational structure and objectives of the campaign); see
generally LOUIS FOURNIER, F.L.Q.: HISTOIRE D’UN MOUVEMENT CLANDESTINE (1982)
(providing a detailed history of FLQ actions, and also of the political, social, and economic
contexts that these events unfolded in); MARC LAURENDEAU, LES QUÉBÉCOIS VIOLENT
(1990) (detailing the life-course of the FLQ campaign, key events, and the membership of
the successive waves of FLQ activity). The ten years that the FLQ was active were
characterized by nine identifiable waves of activity undertaken by 15 independent networks.
LAURENDEAU, supra, at 322–27. The structure of the FLQ was fluid, and as there was no
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political kidnapping and execution in North America,3 and in 1985,
provided the setting where the plot to bomb Air India Flight 182 was
prepared and executed.4 Due to differences in operational definitions and

official membership, anyone inspired to act on behalf of the FLQ could do so. Charters 2,
supra note 2, at 138–40; Crelinsten 1, supra note 1, at 11. Unlike other terrorist
organizations, the FLQ did not often intentionally target civilian populations; however, FLQ
actions were directly responsible for the deaths of seven individuals. Charters 2, supra note
2, at 140–42; see generally, FOURNIER, supra; WILLIAM TETLEY, THE OCTOBER CRISIS 1970,
xxxi-xxxviii (2007) (providing a timeline of major FLQ incidents, but focusing mainly on a
comprehensive analysis of the October Crisis, and governmental responses to it); see also
generally JAMES STEWART, THE FLQ: SEVEN YEARS OF TERRORISM (1st ed. 1970) (providing
an extensive overview of the life-course of the FLQ, the social, political, and cultural context
in which FLQ actions were taken, and criminal justice responses to the FLQ and the
adjudication of convicted members). The FLQ relied predominantly on the use of explosive
devices and, while the FLQ bombing of the Montreal Stock Exchange in February 1969
represented one of the largest and most destructive efforts of the FLQ’s bombing campaign,
it was their actions in the fall of 1970 that thrust the FLQ into the Canadian collective
conscience and spurred the ensuing ‘October Crisis’. See generally id. To date, the
implementation of the War Measures Act during the ‘October Crisis’ remains a hotly
contested issue, which serves as a reference point for how Canada has historically responded
to acts of terrorism. Charters 1, supra note 1, at 17.
3
The kidnapping of James Cross, the British Trade Commissioner in Montreal, and the
kidnapping and eventual execution of Pierre Laporte, the Quebec Deputy Premier and
Minister of Employment and Immigration, was unprecedented and both the provincial and
federal governments struggled with how to appropriately respond. Anthony Kellett,
Terrorism in Canada, 1960–1992, in VIOLENCE IN CANADA: SOCIOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES,
58–60 (Jeffrey Ian Ross ed., 2004) [hereinafter Kellett 1] (presenting a comprehensive
overview of terrorism incidents in Canada). The eventual implementation of the War
Measures Act and Regulations allowed for immense police investigative powers and a
restriction of the civil rights of Canadian citizens. RONALD D. CRELINSTEN, THE INTERNAL
DYNAMICS OF THE FLQ DURING THE OCTOBER CRISIS OF 1970, 10, 63–64 (1987) [hereinafter
CRELINSTEN 2], J. STRATEGIC STUD., 59, 63 (detailing the organizational structure of the FLQ
during the October Crisis of 1970); see also TETLEY, supra note 2, at 81–86.
4
Charters 1, supra note 1, at 16–17, 20; see generally Crelinsten 1, supra note 1, at 8–23;
Kellett 1, supra note 3, at 284–85 (presenting a comprehensive overview of terrorism
incidents in Canada); ANTHONY KELLETT ET AL., TERRORISM IN CANADA 1960–1989 (1990)
(providing the most comprehensive and in depth analysis of patterns of terrorism in Canada
from 1960–1989) [hereinafter KELLETT 2]; see also generally Stephane Leman-Langlois &
Jean-Paul Brodeur, Terrorism Old and New: Counterterrorism in Canada, 6 POLICE PRAC. &
RES. 121, 122–29 (2005) (describing terrorist incidents in Canada, as well as motivations,
strategic goals, and counter-terrorism responses); Stephane Leman-Langlois & Genevieve
Ouellet, L’Evolution du Terrorisme au Canada, 1973–2006, in TERRORISM ET
ANTITERRORISM AU CANADA, 58 (Stephane Leman-Langlois & Jean-Paul Brodeur eds.,
2009) (describing terrorism trends in Canada from 1973–2006); Sam Mullins, ‘Global
Jihad’: The Canadian Experience, 25 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 734, 734–35 (2013)
(investigating the role in which Canadians have participated in the ‘Global Salafi Jihad,’ and

4. AMIRAULT

772

4/6/2017 7:05 PM

AMIRAULT, BOUCHARD, FARRELL & ANDRESEN [Vol. 106

inclusion criteria, estimates of the total number of terrorist incidents
perpetrated in Canada varies, ranging from 326 to 500 reported incidents
between 1960 and 2006.5
Despite enduring significant terrorist incidents, Canada’s legal
response to terrorist offenses has historically been cautious.6 However, in
examining the demographic variables of the perpetrators, operational variables of the
incidents, and investigations and outcomes of criminal justice responses); Genevieve
Ouellet, Les Causes Celebres, in TERRORISM ET ANTITERRORISM AU CANADA 73 (Stephane
Leman-Langlois & Jean-Paul Brodeur eds., 2009) (detailing significant terrorist movements
and groups in Canadian history such as the SOF Doukhobors, Direct Action, the Liberation
Tigers of Tamel Eelam, and the Kadhr family); Kent Roach, Canadian Experiences in
Preventing and Combating Terrorism, in UNDERSTANDING TERRORISM IN AFRICA: BUILDING
BRIDGES AND OVERCOMING THE GAPS, 117, 118–19 (Wafula Okumu & Anelli Botha eds.,
2008) [hereinafter Roach 1] (describing both historic and contemporary responses to
terrorism in Canada, such as the use of the War Measures Act, the implementation of the
Anti-Terrorism Act, and the use of immigration law to address terrorist threats).
Prior to the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the
Pentagon in Washington, the bombing of Air India Flight 182 was the gravest aviation
terrorist attack in history. HON. BOB RAE, LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 1, 36–42 (Air India
Review Secretariat ed., 2005). For an overview of terrorism in Canada prior to 2001, see
Charters 1, supra note 1, at 14–21.
5
In the wake of the Air India bombings the Canadian government commissioned an
investigation to explore the scope, and nature, of terrorism in Canada. In the resulting report,
Kellett and Kellett et al. present that between 1960 and 1989, 428 terrorist events took place
in Canada equaling an average of 14.8 terrorist incidents per year over 29 years. See Kellett
1, supra note 3, at 285; Kellett 2, supra note 4, at 47. Of 428 events reported by Kellett, 366
were domestic while the remaining 62 were international. Kellett 1, supra note 3, at 286.
Kellett’s reported rates of terrorist incidents excludes 511 other events, as well as 93 actions
undertaken to support terrorist efforts. Kellett 2, supra note 4, at 47. During the same time
period, an examination of politically motivated offenses in Canada conducted by Ross
suggests that between 1960 and 1985 approximately 500 ‘political terrorist events’ were
executed, that results in an average of 20 terrorist incidents per year over during those 25
years. Jeffrey Ian Ross, Attributes of Domestic Political Terrorism in Canada, 1960–1985,
11 TERRORISM 213, 213–14 (1988) (identifying terrorist incidents in Canada from 1960–
1985, and discussing the challenges of accurately classifying these incidents). More recently,
Leman-Langois & Ouellet indicate that between 1973 and 2006, 326 terrorist incidents
occurred resulting in an average of 9.9 terrorist events per year over 33 years. See LemanLanglois & Ouellet, supra note 4, at 60.
6
See KENT ROACH, THE 9/11 EFFECT: COMPARATIVE COUNTER-TERRORISM 363–64
(2011) [hereinafter ROACH 2] (providing a comprehensive account of historical and
contemporary Canadian responses to terrorism, placing special emphasis on the
criminalization of terrorism offenses under the auspice of the ATA, as well as the use of
immigration law, security certificates, and preventative detention as a means to address
potential terrorist threats); Irwin Cotler, Thinking Outside the Box: Foundational Principles
for a Counter Terrorism Law and Policy, in THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON
CANADA’S ANTI-TERRORISM BILL 119 (Ronald Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach
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the wake of September 11 the Canadian Government implemented the AntiTerrorism Act (ATA), and for the first time criminalized terrorism-specific
offenses.7 The events of September 11 marked a turning point not only in
how a terrorist threat is constructed globally, but also in the nature of
terrorist activity in Canada. In the fifteen years following September 11,
Canada has seen a proliferation in the number of terrorist offenders
motivated by an Islamic extremist ideology.8 In 2004, Momin Khawaja, the
first offender to be charged under the ATA, was arrested for his
involvement in a terrorist plot that was intended to be executed in the
United Kingdom.9 Khawaja was to provide the expertise that his
counterparts needed to remotely detonate explosive devices.10 Two years
later, the Toronto 18 network was disrupted while plotting to detonate
large-scale explosives targeting governmental offices and agencies, as well
as media outlets.11 In 2007, Said Namouh was arrested and eventually
convicted for participating in an online group that was involved in the
spreading of terrorist propaganda.12
Although some terrorist incidents that occurred in Canada during the

eds., 2001) (addressing the civil and legal rights that need to be accounted for when drafting
counter-terrorism law and policy and criticizing these shortcomings); Kent Roach, Must We
Trade Rights for Security? The Choice Between Smart, Harsh or Proportionate Security
Strategies in Canada and Britain, 27 CARDOZA L. REV. 2151, 2156–58 (2006) [hereinafter
Roach 3] (debating the balance that must be achieved in protecting civil rights, and ensuring
public safety when developing counter-terrorism measures); Donald Stuart, The Dangers of
a Quick Fix Legislation in the Criminal Law: The Anti-Terrorism Bill C-36 Should be
Withdrawn, in THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON CANADA’S ANTI-TERRORISM BILL 205
(Ronald Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach eds., 2001) (warning against the dangers
of rapidly implementing anti-terrorist legislation, of over-broadening the definition of
terrorism, and of irrevocably increasing state powers).
7
See Anti-Terrorism Act, S.C. 2001, c 41, (Can.).
8
Crelinsten 1, supra note 1, at 16; Mullins, supra note 4, at 735–38.
9
ROACH 2, supra note 6, at 407.
10
Id. at 407.
11
Id. at 408.
12
Robert Diab, Sentencing of Terrorism Offenses After 9/11: A Comparative Review of
Early Case Law, in TERRORISM, LAW AND DEMOCRACY: TEN YEARS AFTER 9/11, 351–353
(Craig Forcese & Francois Crepeau eds., 2013) (addressing the legal changes made to the
CCC following the implementation ATA, as well as presenting case studies of the first
offenders prosecuted under the new terrorism-specific offences). Hiva Mohammad Alizadeh,
Misbahuddin Ahmed, Khurram Syed Sher, Matin Abdul Stanikzy, Mohamed Hershi, John
Nuttall, Amanda Karody. Chiheb Esseghaier and Raed Jasser all remain in pre-trial custody
for their alleged involvement in Islamic Extremist inspired terrorist plots. Mullins, supra
note 4, at 744.
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1980s and 1990s were motivated by imported grievances (i.e., conflicts that
originated outside of Canada),13 the interconnectedness of offenders and the
accessibility of resources in today’s globalized world present new
challenges to law enforcement.14 The ATA impacted all aspects of the
criminal justice system; however, following the criminalization of
terrorism-specific offenses, prosecutors now face increasing scrutiny to not
only successfully convict terrorist offenders, but also achieve the harshest
sentences possible. While one of the key goals of criminalizing terrorist
related activity has been to proactively prevent terrorist incidents, the ability
of these new criminal provisions to function as deterrents for terrorist
activities has been questioned. It is commonly noted that the threat of long
periods of incarceration would not dissuade individuals from committing
terrorist offenses.15 Akin to this sentiment, Roach cites Canadian legal
scholar Douglas Schmeiser who, following the October Crisis in 1971,16
stated that, “the ordinary criminal law adequately covers dangerous conduct
by insurgents.”17 However, the extent to which this holds true in the current
13
For example, the bombing of Air India Flight 182 is one example of an imported
grievance as the incident is believed to have been perpetrated by Sikh extremists in
retaliation for actions carried out by the Indian Government in the Punjab state of India in
1984. Crelinsten 1, supra note 1, at 18.
14
Charters 1, supra note 1, at 22–28; Crelinsten 1, supra note 1, at 25–27; LemanLanglois & Brodeur, supra note 4, at 134–139; GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, BUILDING
RESILIENCE AGAINST TERRORISM: CANADA’S COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY 9 (2011)
(detailing Canada’s counter-terrorism strategies and the four pillars of prevent, protect, deny,
and respond).
15
Kent Roach, Canada’s Response to Terrorism, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND
POLICY 511, 519 (Victor V. Ramraj et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter Roach 4] (providing a
detailed analysis of the ATA, the criminalization of terrorism offenses and the establishment
of investigative hearings, security certificates and the emphasis on public safety and
security); Kent Roach, The Criminal Law and Terrorism, in GLOBAL ANTI-TERRORISM LAW
AND POLICY 129, 137 (Victor V. Ramraj, Michael Hor, Kent Roach & George Williams eds.,
2005) [hereinafter Roach 5] (addressing the strengths and limitations of criminalizing
terrorism offenses in the context of the limits of the law); Martha Shaffer, Effectiveness of
Anti-Terrorism Legislation: Does Bill C-36 Give Us What We Need?, in THE SECURITY OF
FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON CANADA’S ANTI-TERRORISM BILL 195, 196–201 (Ronald Daniels,
Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach eds., 2001) (questioning if the criminalization of terrorismspecific offenses are an effective way to address terrorist threat, as well as if the proposed
measures are constitutional).
16
The October Crisis refers to the abduction of James Cross, the British Trade
Commissioner in Montreal, and the abduction and execution of Pierre Laporte, the Quebec
Deputy Premier and Minister of Employment and Immigration, by the FLQ in October,
1970. See FOURNIER, supra note 2.
17
Kent Roach, The New Terrorism Offences and the Criminal Law, in THE SECURITY OF
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climate is unclear.
The current study investigates variability in the sentencing outcomes
of terrorist offenders sanctioned in Canada between 1963 and 2010,
focusing on the potential impact that the implementation of the ATA has
had on the legal processing of terrorist offenders. The 47-year observation
period is divided into three periods. Period 1 (arrests between 1963 and
1982) is comprised exclusively of members of the Quebec Liberation Front
(FLQ) while Period 2 (arrests between 1983 and 2001) includes offenders
motivated by Sikh extremism and eco-terrorism. Finally, Period 3 (arrests
between 2002 and 2010) includes offenders who were motivated by Islamic
extremism and adjudicated following the enactment of the ATA. We
investigate if there are discernable periods where offenders are sanctioned
more punitively than others, and if offenders prosecuted after the
implementation of the ATA are sanctioned more or less severely than those
prosecuted prior to it. As terrorist offenders have been identified as a unique
offending population in need of specialized legal designations, it is
imperative to examine if the sentences issued under terrorism-specific
offenses are more or less punitive than those issued under general criminal
provisions.
I.

LEGAL RESPONSES TO TERRORISM IN CANADA

Similar to other countries (e.g. United Kingdom, United States),
Canada has primarily adopted a legislative response to terrorism. The use of
legal measures to respond to terrorist activity is referred to as the “criminal
justice model,” whereby terrorist activity is identified as a distinct legal
category of crime.18 While many states had experience prosecuting terrorist
offenders prior to September 11, few had enacted legislative policies that

FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON CANADA’S ANTI-TERRORISM BILL 151, 154 (Ronald Daniels et al. eds.,
2001) [hereinafter Roach 6] (quoting Douglas Schmeiser, Control of Apprehended
Insurrection: Emergency Measures vs. The Criminal Code, 4 Man. L.J. 359, 365 (1971))
(detailing each of the new criminal offenses in Section 83 of the Criminal Code of Canada as
established by the ATA).
18
Ronald Crelinsten, Perspectives on Counterterrorism: From Stovepipes to a
Comprehensive Approach, 8 PERSP. TERRORISM 2, 3 (2014) [hereinafter Crelinsten 3]
(contrasting different models of counter-terrorism such as coercive counter-terrorism,
proactive counter-terrorism, persuasive counter-terrorism, and defensive counter-terrorism);
Ronald Crelinsten & Alex P. Schmid, Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year
Balance Sheet, 4 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 307, 309 (1992) (identifying differing
responses to counter-terrorism by western nations and their successes and failures globally
over the past 25 years).
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codified specific terrorist offenses into their penal code. However, the past
decade has seen a proliferation in the legal measures implemented to
prevent and prosecute terrorist offenses.19
Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act (Bill C-36) was granted Royal Assent on
December 18, 2001, 98 days after the September 11th attack. Over the past
32 years, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (established in
1982) has functioned to temper Canadian responses to terrorist incidents.
This was also true during the drafting of Bill C-36.20 For the first time the
19

See Crelinsten 1, supra note 1, at 3; see also Gary LaFree & Gary Ackerman, The
Empirical Study of Terrorism: Social and Legal Research, 5 ANN. REV. LAW. SOC. SCI. 347,
364–65 (2009) (providing an in-depth overview of the individual and macro level causes of
terrorism, as well as the defining characteristics of terrorist offenders and counter-terrorism
strategies); Gary Lafree & James Hendrickson, Build a Criminal Justice Policy for
Terrorism, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 781, 783–84 (2007) (arguing that the advantages
of developing a criminal justice policy model for responding to terrorism include helping to
understand best practices for the criminal justice system in responding to those who commit
terrorist actions, helping to identify the etiology of terrorist behavior, and helping to
understand the adjudication of terrorist offenders); see generally John Braithwaite,
Regulating Terrorism, in CRIMINOLOGISTS ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY 383
(Brian Forst et al. eds., 2011) (suggesting the criminal justice model of responding to
terrorism is insufficient and that a public health model including primary, secondary, and
tertiary models would be more efficient); David Klinger & Charles Heal, Manifestations of
Aggression: Terrorism, Crime and War, in CRIMINOLOGISTS ON TERRORISM AND HOMELAND
SECURITY 17 (Brian Forst et al. eds., 2011) (providing an overview of the differentiation
between terrorist acts as criminal offenses and acts of war, and describing the context in
which terrorist actions emerge).
Historically, Canada’s legal response to terrorist offenses and offenders has been limited.
The Emergencies Act 1988 was implemented as a means to revise the legal powers
established under the War Measures Act. The Emergencies Act concerns public order,
international and war-related emergencies; however, while it currently remains in effect it
has yet to be employed. Charters 1, supra note 1, at 32; Stuart, supra note 6, at 208. The
aftermath of the Air India bombing called into question the roles and responsibilities of
Canada’s intelligence and policing agencies, and consequently Canada has had a National
Counter-Terrorism Plan in effect since 1989. Jeffrey Ian Ross, From the McDonald Report
to the Kelly Committees: The Government Research and Policy Making Process Connected
to Oppositional Political Terrorism in Canada, 8 J. HOMELAND SECURITY & EMERGENCY
MGMT. 1, 10 (2011) (presenting an overview of the development of the policies developed in
Canada in responses to oppositional political terrorism from 1977 to 1999). The
Emergencies Act was the last security-related legislation to be implemented prior to the
ATA. Charters 1, supra note 1, at 32.
20
Cotler, supra note 6, at 120; Kent Roach, Did September 11 Change Everything?
Struggling to Preserve Canadian Values in the Face of Terrorism, 47 MCGILL L.J. 893,
942–944 (2002) [hereinafter Roach 7] (discussing the changes and challenges faced by the
Canadian government in balancing public safety with sovereignty and democracy following
September 11); see generally ROACH 2, supra note 6, at 363; Roach 3, supra note 6, at 2152;
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ATA legally defined terrorism, and established specific terrorism-related
crimes in the Criminal Code of Canada (CCC).21 The CCC was amended on
the assumption that offense classifications that had previously been used to
prosecute terrorist offenders were no longer sufficient following September
11 owing to the fact that they were predominantly reactive as opposed to
proactive.22 As such, terrorism was defined under Section 83.01 of the CCC
as:
An act or omission, in or outside Canada, that is committed (A) in whole or in part for
political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause, and (B) in whole or in
part with the intention of intimidating the public, or a segment of the public, with
regard to its security, including its economic security, or compelling a person, a
government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain from
doing any act, whether the public or the person, government or organization is inside
23
or outside Canada.

Along with providing a definition of terrorist activity, the ATA introduced
five new indictable offenses with maximum punishments ranging from ten
years to life imprisonment.24 Previously, terrorist offenders in Canada were
prosecuted using existing Criminal Code offenses such as first degree
murder, conspiracy, kidnapping, hostage taking, possession of explosives
with the intent to discharge, possession of illegal weapons, accessory after
the fact, and threatening to murder an internationally protected person.25
The ATA established the offenses of: participating in the activities of a
terrorist group, facilitating terrorist activities, instructing the carrying out of
terrorist activities, instructing activities for terrorist groups to enhance their
ability to carry out terrorist activities, and harboring or concealing

Stuart, supra note 6, at 211.
21
Cotler, supra note 6 at 121–22; ROACH 2, supra note 6, at 376; Roach 3, supra note 6,
at 2160–62; Roach 4, supra note 15, at 513–21; Roach 6, supra note 17, at 154; Shaffer,
supra note 15, at 196. See generally KENT ROACH, THE UNIQUE CHALLENGES OF TERRORISM
PROSECUTIONS: TOWARDS A WORKABLE RELATION BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND EVIDENCE
(2010) [hereinafter ROACH 8] (providing an overview of the ATA and the criminalization of
terrorist offenses in Canada, as well as the challenges that prosecutors face when trying
terrorist offenders).
22
Cotler, supra note 6, at 118; Diab, supra note 12, at 369 (addressing legal changes
made to the CCC following the implementation ATA, as well as presenting case studies of
the first offenders prosecuted under the new terrorism-specific offences); ROACH 2, supra
note 6, at 376.
23
Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 § 83.01.
24
Roach 6, supra note 17, at 160.
25
Id. at 152.
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terrorists.26 Unique to all terrorism-specific offenses is the requirement for
prosecutors to prove that their commission was motivated by either a
political, religious, or ideological belief.27
Furthermore, the ATA criminalized offenses related to the financing of
terrorist activities, specifically either directly or indirectly providing,
collecting, possessing, or making property or services available to those
who wish to engage in terrorist activities.28 As a part of these legal
designations, individuals are required to report “(1) the existence of
property in their possession or control that they know is owned or
controlled by a terrorist group or (2) information about a proposed
transaction involving such property” to law enforcement.29 The inclusion of
these offenses was done in part to ensure compliance with UN Security
Council Resolution 1373 and the UN International Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorist Financing.30 Additionally, in 2001, the Proceeds of
Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act introduced
additional mechanisms designed to “detect and deter money laundering and
terrorist financing.”31 This Act further stipulates that individuals must
legally report monetary transactions, or property holdings, if they are
potentially connected to terrorist activities, to the Financial Transactions
and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC).32
In the years immediately following the implementation of the ATA,
prosecutors continued to respond to terrorist threats by utilizing
immigration law, as opposed to criminal law, and the first terrorism-specific
26

Id. at 152, 160–66.
See ROACH 2, supra note 6, at 378–79; ROACH 8, supra note 21, at 94.
28
Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 § 83.01–83.04; see ROACH 2, supra
note 6, at 376; ROACH 4, supra note 15, at 514–15.
29
Kent Roach, The Three Year Review of Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act: The Need for
Greater Restraint and Fairness, Non-Discrimination, and Special Advocates, 54 U.N.B. L.J.
308, 316–17 (2005) [hereinafter Roach 9] (describing the successes and failures of Canada’s
ATA three years following its implementation, and highlighting that restraint is needed in
legally defining terrorism, offenses, and terrorist groups, and in the treatment of terrorist
suspects who are not legal citizens of Canada).
30
Kent Roach, Sources and Trends in Post 9/11 Anti-Terrorism Laws, 6 (U. of Toronto,
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 8899291, 2006) http:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?
abstract_id=899291; see ROACH 2, supra note 6, at 361, 382; Roach 5, supra note 15, at 133.
31
Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, S.C. 2000, c 17
as amended by S.C. 2001 c 41, s.3(a), http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/P-24.501/page2.html#h-3.
32
Roach 4, supra note 15, at 517; Roach 9, supra note 29, at 317; see generally ROACH
2, supra note 6, at 376.
27
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charges were not laid until 2004.33 Despite the emphasis of the ATA on
proactive responses, as well as public safety and security, the changes made
to the CCC were not without criticism. Legal scholars not only questioned
the necessity of amending the CCC, but also the speed at which these
changes were implemented.34 One of the key criticisms was the inclusive
definition of ‘terrorism.’ Roach noted that the definition of terrorism
included in Bill C-36 was broader than those utilized by either the United
Kingdom or the United States.35 He further cautioned that Canada’s
expansive definition of terrorism, in conjunction with new investigative
powers, offense classifications and strict punishments allowed by the Act,
could be applied to citizens who were simply engaged in political protests
(such as environmental issues, Aboriginal land claims, or anti-globalization
protests).36
Further terrorism-specific offenses were added to the CCC in 2004 and
2013. Under the auspice of the Public Safety Act, committing a hoax
related to terrorist activity was criminalized in 2004.37 In 2013, both the
Combating Terrorism Act and the Nuclear Terrorism Act were
implemented. Reflective of the ATA’s goal of proactively preventing
terrorist activity, the Combating Terrorism Act criminalized offenses
related to leaving Canada in order to participate in, or carry out, terrorist
activity, as well as concealing a person who has, or is likely, to carry out
terrorist activity.38 The Nuclear Terrorism Act instituted four nuclear
terrorism-related offenses. In doing so, this allowed Canada to ratify the
“Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
33

Diab, supra note 12, at 357.
See generally Roach 4, supra note 15, at 511–33; Shaffer, supra note 15, at 196–204;
Stuart, supra note 6, at 205–12; Gary T. Trotter, The Anti-Terrorism Bill and Preventative
Restraints on Liberty, in THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON CANADA’S ANTITERRORISM BILL 239, 240–46 (Ronald Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach eds., 2001)
(noting the need for caution when implementing restrictive measures on a citizenry that are
intended to prevent terrorism, as well as the use of peace bonds as preventative measures).
35
Roach 7, supra note 20, at 904.
36
Roach 7, supra note 20, at 897–98, 913.
37
Kent Roach, Ten Ways to Improve Canadian Anti-Terrorism Law, 51 CRIM. L.Q. 102,
109 (2005) [hereinafter Roach 10] (highlighting key aspects that could improve Canada’s
anti-terrorism laws, such as tightening the definition of terrorism, reforming preventative
arrests and amending the Canada Evidence Act).
38
Combating Terrorism Act, S.C. 2013, c. 9 (Can.) (adding the following offenses to the
CCC: “Leaving Canada to participate in the activity of a terrorist group,” “Leaving Canada
to facilitate terrorist activity,” “Leaving Canada to commit an offence for a terrorist group,”
and “Concealing a person who carried out terrorist activity.”).
34

4. AMIRAULT

780

4/6/2017 7:05 PM

AMIRAULT, BOUCHARD, FARRELL & ANDRESEN [Vol. 106

Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism.”39
II.

SENTENCING OUTCOMES OF TERRORIST OFFENDERS

As indicated by the criminalization of specific terrorism-related
offenses, terrorist offenders have been identified as requiring special legal
provisions. Despite this, few studies have investigated the legal processing
of terrorist offenders. When comparing differences between the sentencing
outcomes of terrorist and general offending populations, previous studies
report that when convicted of similar offenses, terrorist offenders are
sentenced more severely, and that the most salient aggravating factor for
terrorist offenders is having a political motivation.40 For individuals accused
39

Nuclear Terrorism Act, S.C. 2013, c. 13 (Can.) (adding the following offenses to the
CCC: “Possession, etc., of nuclear material, radioactive material or device,” “Use or
alteration of nuclear material, radioactive material or device,” “Commission of indictable
offence to obtain nuclear material,” and “Threats” to commit such offences).
40
Mindy S. Bradley-Engen et al., Punishing Terrorists: A Re-Examination of U.S.
Federal Sentencing in the Postguidelines Era, 19 INT’L. CRIM. JUST. REV. 433, 445–49
(2009) [hereinafter Bradley-Engen 1] (contrasting the average sentencing outcomes achieved
for terrorist and non-terrorist offenders convicted of similar crimes where findings indicate
that revisions to sentencing guidelines have impacted sentencing disparities between terrorist
and non-terrorist populations); Brent L. Smith & Kelly R. Damphousse, Punishing Political
Offenders: The Effect of Political Motive on Federal Sentencing Decisions, 34 CRIMINOLOGY
289, 298–300 (1996) [hereinafter Smith & Damphousse 1] (reporting that political
motivation is a salient extra-legal factor that functions to increase sentence severity for
terrorist offenders); Brent L. Smith & Kelly R. Damphousse, Terrorism, Politics and
Punishment: A Test of Structural-Contextual Theory and the “Liberation Hypothesis”, 36
CRIMINOLOGY 67, 68 (1998) [hereinafter Smith & Damphousse 2] (finding evidence to
support that both the structural-contextual theory and liberation hypothesis can account for
disparities in the sentence lengths issued to terrorist offenders when committing similar
crime types as general offending populations); see generally Kelly R. Damphousse & Chris
Shields, The Morning After: Assessing the Effect of Major Terrorism Events on Prosecution
Strategies and Outcomes, 23 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 174, 174 (2007) (addressing changes
in prosecutorial strategies and the sentencing outcomes of terrorist offenders both preceding
and following major terrorist incidents); Brian D. Johnson, Cross-Classified Multilevel
Models: An Application to the Criminal Case Processing of Indicted Terrorists, 28 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 163, 163–87 (2011) (providing an overview of the offense,
offender, case processing terrorism incident, terrorist group and court characteristics that
have the potential to impact the criminal justice processing of terrorist offenders);
Christopher A. Shields, Kelly R. Damphousse & Brent L. Smith, Their Day in Court:
Assessing Guilty Plea Rates Among Terrorists, 22 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 261, 261–65
(2006) (investigating differences in the rates at which terrorist and general offending
populations enter guilty pleas, and the legal and extra-legal factors that predict this decision);
Brent L. Smith et al., The Prosecution and Punishment of International Terrorists in Federal
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of terrorist offenses, having co-defendants both reduces the likelihood of
going to trial and of being convicted.41 Furthermore, the timing of an
offender’s adjudication has been found to play a significant role in the
sentencing outcomes of terrorist offenders. Damphousse and Shields report
that terrorist offenders prosecuted in the two years following a major
terrorist incident are sanctioned less severely than those punished prior to
it.42 The observed discrepancies in sentence outcomes can in part be
attributed to changing prosecutorial strategies such as broadening the
definition of terrorism and removing focus from the political nature of the
crime.43
Following the establishment of the ATA, in order to successfully
prosecute offenders charged with terrorism-related offenses, the Crown
must prove that an offender was motivated by a political, religious or
ideological motivation.44 In addition to this extra burden of proof, Section
718.2 of the CCC has deemed that where evidence exists to indicate that an
offense was a terrorist offense that it should also be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.45 While some legal scholars have called into
question whether or not terrorism is in fact a distinct type of crime, or if it
should merely be considered as an aggravating factor at sentencing, it
appears that in Canada participation in terrorism is both a legally distinct
crime type, as well as an aggravating factor.46
To date, only one study has attempted to investigate the impact of
extra-legal and legal factors on the sentence severity of terrorist offenders
Courts: 1980–1998, 1 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 311, 311–29 (2002) (contrasting
differences in the criminal justice processing of domestic and international terrorists, and
reporting that international terrorists are subject to more politicized trails, are less likely to
plead guilty and are subject to longer sentences).
41
See Johnson, supra note 40, at 183. See generally Bradley-Engen 1, supra note 40, at
444–49; Shields et al., supra note 40 at 270–71; Damphousse & Shields, supra note 40, at
184–90; Smith & Damphousse 1, supra note 40, at 303–12.
42
Damphousse & Shields, supra note 40, at 187.
43
Id. at 190–91.
44
Roach 7, supra note 20, at 903.
45
See generally Clayton C. Ruby et al., SENTENCING, 254–56 (8th ed. 2012) (discussing
factors that can serve as aggravating and mitigating circumstances for violent, weapons and
terrorist offences in Canada).
46
Diab, supra note 12, at 353–56; Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, Is Terrorism a Crime
or an Aggravating Factor in Sentencing, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1017, 1027–29 (2006)
(arguing that terrorism is not a unique crime type, as terrorists do not have increased
culpability when compared to general offending populations, but do pose a greater threat to
society and as such should be sanctioned more severely).
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convicted in Canada following the implementation of the ATA. After
reviewing the sentencing outcomes of Khawaja, members of the Toronto 18
and Namouh, Diab reports that the mitigating factors uncovered for these
offenders were similar to those of general offending populations.47 As such,
being younger, not having a prior record, accepting responsibility and
expressing remorse, willingly participating in rehabilitation, entering a
guilty plea, and having familial responsibilities were all found to decrease
sentence severity.48 However, while some of the aggravating factors
identified, such as the use of firearms, planning to commit an offense, and
not expressing remorse, are typical of general offending populations, other
aggravating factors identified are unique to terrorist offenses. Diab notes
that having a leadership role, recruiting others, knowingly participating in a
terrorist offense, planning an offense that would lead to mass murder,
planning to execute a crime motivated by race, ethnicity, or religion, and
being known to have actively participated in online groups all functioned to
increase sentence severity.49
III. THE PRESENT STUDY
Canada has a storied history of terrorist incidents motivated by
grievances originating both within, and outside, of Canada.50 Despite the
significance and gravity of terrorist incidents that occurred in the 1970s and
1980s, it was not until the implementation of the ATA that terrorismspecific offenses were criminalized in Canada.51 While much is known
about the incidents themselves, less is known about how the criminal justice
system has historically responded to terrorist offenders, and how the current
response to this offending population compares to past reactions. While
Diab presents a primary investigation of the sentencing outcomes of a
selection of terrorist offenders prosecuted after the implementation of the
ATA, he relies on a review of case law for his analysis and, as such, does
47

Diab, supra note 12, at 357–70.
See generally Diab, supra note 12, at 357–70 (reviewing initial prosecutions under the
ATA, and identifying the aggravating and mitigating factors that have been utilized by the
courts in these initial cases).
49
Id. at 357–70.
50
See Crelinsten 1, supra note1, at 10–17; KELLETT 2, supra note 4, at 47–72; Charters
1, supra note 1, at 14–20; Leman-Langlois & Brodeur, supra note 4, at 122–29; Jeffrey Ian
Ross & Ted Robert Gurr, Why Terrorism Subsides: A Comparative Study of Canada and the
United States, 21 COMP. POL. 405, 408–14 (1989).
51
See ROACH 2, supra note 6, at 376; Roach 4, supra note 15, at 513; Roach 6, supra
note 17, at 160–67; Shaffer, supra note 15, at 196–201.
48
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not empirically test the impact of legal and extra-legal factors on sentencing
outcomes.52 Furthermore, Diab does not compare the sentencing outcomes
of recently adjudicated terrorist offenders to cases historically prosecuted in
Canada. The current study seeks to build on Diab’s work by investigating
variability in the sentencing outcomes of terrorist offenders sanctioned in
Canada between 1963 and 2010, focusing on the potential impact that the
implementation of the ATA has had on the legal processing of terrorist
offenders. We investigate if there are discernable periods where offenders
are sanctioned more punitively than others, and if offenders prosecuted after
the implementation of the ATA are sanctioned more or less severely than
those prosecuted prior to it.
A.

DATA AND METHODS

In order to investigate the sentencing variability of terrorist offenders
sanctioned in Canada, a new dataset was created. The Officially
Adjudicated Terrorists in Canada (OATC) dataset is comprised of 153
offenders who were convicted of terrorist related offenses in Canada
between 1963 and 2010. Offenders who had been convicted of terrorist
related activities were identified as extensively as possible in one of three
ways. First, the website compiled and maintained by Canadian terrorism
expert Dr. Leman-Langlois (Terrorism and Counterterrorism Research
Group (TCRG)) was consulted to acquire any names of terrorist offenders
identified in the extensive list of Canadian terrorist incidents cited there.53
Second, keyword searches in three legal databases (CanLII, Best Case and
Quicklaw) were undertaken, and, third, relevant texts and news sources
were consulted. Once identified, offenders were subject to a name search in
the three legal databases. Additionally, each legal database was searched
using the keywords “terrorism,” “terrorist,” “terror,” and “political
violence.” If an offender was identified in one legal database, a name search
was then undertaken in the other two to ensure that all legal documents
available pertaining to a specific case were located. The use of texts and
news sources (e.g. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation) was especially
important for identifying historical cases. Lastly, a Google search was
subsequently employed for each individual identified in order to collect any
other relevant information.
52

See Diab, supra note 12, at 357–70.
TERRORISM AND COUNTERTERRORISM RESEARCH GROUP (TCRG), http://www.ertatcrg.org/liens. htm.
53
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A total of 279 legal documents, 5 texts, and 227 news sources were
consulted in the construction of the OATC. Of the 153 offenders, 70.6% (n
= 108) were convicted for their participation in FLQ activities. Legal
documents were available for 30% (n = 46) of the individuals, which was in
large part due to the high proportion of FLQ members and the limited
availability of historical legal documents. News sources and texts were
available for 91.5% (n = 140) of the sample. For each case, 182 variables
were coded pertaining to the offender’s age, place of birth, religion,
motivation, participation in the offense, charge counts, conviction counts,
sentence issued, appeals undertaken by either the Crown or Defense, and
the final sentence rendered.
As sentence outcome serves as the key dependent variable in these
analyses, only offenders for whom a final sentence outcome could be
identified were included. Initially, 183 cases were identified; however, 30
were excluded for the following reasons: sentence information could not be
located, the offender was still in pre-trial custody, or charges have been laid
but the offender remains at large. Two offenders convicted in connection
with the plot to bomb Air India Flight 112 were excluded given that their
convictions were overturned in 1992 and that they were granted a stay of
charges in 1996. Furthermore, Inderjit Singh Reyat (the only offender
convicted in connection with the Air India bombings) has been tried on four
separate occasions for his involvement in the incident. In light of this, only
his final trial, concluding in 2010, is included. There were five offenders
who were each convicted of two separate offenses related to their
involvement in the FLQ. However, given the small number of recidivists, it
was not possible to control for this in the multivariate models.
B.

MEASURES

1.

Dependent Variable

Sentence Length. The key outcome variable of interest is sentence
length, which was coded at both the end of the offender’s initial trial and
following any appeals pursued by either the Crown or Defense.
Consequently, the final sentence issued is utilized and, in keeping with
previous studies examining sentencing outcomes, measured in months.54 On
54

Mindy S. Bradley-Engen et al., The Time Penalty: Examining the Relationship
Between Time to Conviction and Trial vs. Plea Disparities in Sentencing, 29 JUST. Q. 830,
839 (2012) [hereinafter Bradley-Engen 2] (investigating how the timing of an offender’s
guilty plea can impact sentence severity, noting that time to conviction has a significant
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average, offenders were sentenced to 88.72 months. The shortest sentence
issued was 2 months, while the longest was 300. All but 12 of the offenders
(n = 141) were incarcerated in prison. Of the remaining 12 offenders, 10
were issued suspended sentences and 2 were issued probation terms.
Though we preserved the original sentence length meted out for these 12
offenders, we added a control for “suspended sentence/probation” in our
multivariate models to account for the difference between these cases and
the majority of others.55
2.

Main Independent Variables

Contextual Factors. In order to investigate how being arrested at
different time points, and convicted under different sections of the Criminal
Code, impacts sentencing outcomes, a series of contextual factors were
coded. The 47-year observation period was divided into three periods:
Period 1 (offenders arrested between 1963 and 1982), Period 2 (offenders
arrested between 1983 and 2001), and Period 3 (offenders arrested between
2002 and 2010). For many of the historical cases it was challenging to
identify the offender’s year of conviction, and as a result, year of arrest is
utilized throughout. Period 1 is exclusively comprised of FLQ members (n
= 108). Although FLQ actions terminated in 1972, six members of the FLQ
cell responsible for the kidnapping of James Cross fled Canada upon his
release, and did not return until the late 1970s and early 1980s (1978–
1982). Upon their return, they were prosecuted for their involvement in the
October Crisis, and as a result of this, the first period is extended to 1982,
the year in which the last FLQ member was arrested. With the exception of
these residual FLQ members, no other terrorist offenders in our dataset
were arrested between 1972 and 1982.
Period 2, ranging from 1983 to 2001, contains a large proportion of
offenders motivated by political grievances and Sikh extremism, as well as
the only two offenders motivated by eco-terrorism (n = 22). For Period 2,

impact on sentence outcomes); see Bradley-Engen 1, supra note 40, at 441; Damphousse &
Shields, supra note 40, at 187; Smith & Damphousse 1, supra note 40, at 302; Jeffery T.
Ulmer & Brian Johnson, Sentencing in Context: A Multilevel Analysis, 42 CRIMINOLOGY
137, 148 (2004) (examining the impact of contextual level and individual case level
influences on sentencing).
55
We also considered dropping these cases entirely from the multivariate analysis.
Doing so, however, did not substantially change any of the results. Given the small sample
of Canadian cases available, we opted to preserve all cases we could, and simply control for
differences in sentence dispositions issued in the statistical models.
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the end date of 2001 was selected as it marks the implementation of the
ATA, and the creation of new legal dispositions that could only be applied
to offenders arrested from 2002 onwards. Period 3 consists of offenders
who were arrested after the implementation of the ATA from 2002 to 2010
and, as such, this period serves as a means to explore changing criminal
justice responses to terrorist offenders after the implementation of this new
legislation (n = 23). The third period contains the 11 members of the
Toronto 18 who were successfully prosecuted for their involvement in this
terrorist plot, as well as Momin Khawaja. Each period variable was coded
as ‘offender not arrested’ during period (0), or ‘offender arrested’ during
period (1).
In order to investigate whether being convicted of terrorism-specific
offenses impacts sentencing outcomes, three variables were created to
capture whether or not offenders were sanctioned under terrorism-specific
or general legal provisions. The first measures whether or not an offender
was convicted of a “Terrorism Offense” only and was coded as “not
convicted of a terrorism offense” (0), or “convicted of a terrorism offense”
(1). Following the implementation of the ATA, only 7.3% (n = 11) of
offenders were convicted solely of a terrorist offense. In contrast, 89.5% (n
= 137) of offenders were convicted of a “General Criminal Code Offense”
only and were coded as “offender not convicted of a general Criminal Code
offense” (0), or “offender convicted of a general Criminal Code offense”
(1). Only 3.3% (n = 5) of offenders were convicted of both a “Terrorism
Offense” and a “General Criminal Code Offense.” This factor was coded as
“offender not convicted of both a terrorism and general offense” (0), or
“offender convicted of both a terrorism and general offense” (1).
Terrorism-Specific Factors. A series of terrorism-specific factors were
coded in an effort to explore the changing nature of terrorist activity in
Canada over the past 47 years, as well as the potential impact that factors
unique to terrorism cases have on sentencing outcomes. Drawing on
previous empirical investigations, the current study examines eight
terrorism-related factors.56 The first considers whether or not the offender
was able to complete their offense (Completion), and is measured as
“offense detected prior to completion” (0), or “offense completed” (1). In
total, 79.1% (n = 121) of offenders were able to complete their offense.
56

See Bradley-Engen 1, supra note 40, at 441–44; Diab, supra note 12, at 357–70;
Damphousse & Shields, supra note 40, at 183–84; Christopher A. Shields et al., supra note
40, at 268–70; Smith & Damphousse 1, supra note 40, at 302–03; Brent L. Smith et al.,
supra note 40, at 317–19.
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Next, a series of dummy variables were coded in order to capture varying
offense severities. The first dummy variable accounts for whether or not the
offender’s actions resulted in the death of a civilian (i.e. first degree murder,
manslaughter) and was coded as “actions did not result in the death of an
individual” (0), or “actions did result in the death of an individual” (1).
Approximately one quarter of the offenders engaged in activities that
resulted in the death of a civilian (23.5%). The second dummy variable
considers offenders who engaged in an offense that posed an increased
threat to human lives or resulted in the injury of civilians, such as armed
robbery, assault, attempted murder, participating in the actions of a terrorist
group, facilitating terrorist activity, and attempting to participate in terrorist
activity. In total, 60.1% of offenders participated in such an offense and this
factor was coded as “no increased threat to human lives or civilian injury”
(0), or “increased threat to human lives or civilian injury” (1). Lastly, a third
dummy variable was created to account for offenses that posed no threat to
human lives, such as perjury, accessory after the fact and sedition, and was
coded as “threat to human lives” (0), “no threat to human lives” (1). The
remaining 16.3% of offenders engaged in an offense that posed no direct
threat to human lives.
Motivations were organized into seven categories: (1)
nationalism/separatism (n = 108), (2) Islamic extremism (n = 14), (3)
political (e.g. the Israel/Palestine conflict, protest of the Armenian
Genocide, capitalism) (n = 17), (4) Sikh extremism (n = 6), (5) personal
(e.g. assistance of a family member, retaliation for personal grievance) (n =
5), (6) eco-terrorism (n = 2), and (7) financial (n = 1). A total of five
weapons were utilized, or intended to be utilized, by the offenders: (1)
explosive devices, (2) firearm, (3) arson, (4) explosive device and firearm
and (5) no weapon utilized. The most commonly utilized weapons were
explosive devices (49.7%), while 15.7% of the offenders did not utilize a
weapon in the commission of their offense. As terrorist offenses have the
potential to cross international borders, the location of the completed, or
planned, offense was also considered. Almost all of the offenders either
completed, or intended to complete, their offenses in Canada (96.7%),
while those who looked outside of Canada’s borders either planned, or
completed, their offense in the United Kingdom, the United States or
Bosnia.57
57
One offender was convicted for his participation in the spreading of terrorist
propaganda online. As a result of this the location of this offense was coded as “No specific
location intended.”
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The extent to which attending a training camp affects sentencing
outcomes for both historically and recently adjudicated offenders remains
unclear. Participation in a terrorist training camp was coded as “did not
attend terrorist training camp” (0), or “attended terrorist training camp” (1).
In total, 21.6% of the offenders attended a training camp or actively
prepared for their involvement in terrorist activities in some way. Training
camps and preparatory actions were undertaken in Quebec (60.6%), Ontario
(21.1%), British Columbia (15.2%), and Pakistan (3%). Four offense
variables were operationalized to investigate the changing nature of terrorist
activity over time: Terrorism, Violence, Weapons and Other. For each
offender, convictions for only the most serious offense were recorded, and
as such, the variables are mutually exclusive. Terrorism offenses are those
identified by Section 83 of the CCC (i.e. facilitating terrorist activity,
training for terrorist purposes, instructing others to carry out an activity for
a terrorist group) and were coded as “no conviction for terrorism offense”
(0), or “conviction for terrorism offense” (1). Violent offenses included
first-degree murder, attempted murder, assault, and manslaughter and were
coded as ‘no conviction for violent offense’ (0) or ‘conviction for violent
offense’ (1). Weapons offenses included possession of an illegal weapon,
activating an explosive substance, and possession of an explosive with the
intent to discharge and were coded as ‘no conviction for weapons offense’
(0) or ‘conviction for weapons offense’ (1). Theft/Other offenses included
auto theft, perjury, sedition, accessory after the fact, and kidnapping and
were coded as ‘no conviction for theft/other offense’ (0) or ‘conviction for
theft or other offense’ (1). In total, 10.5% of offenders were convicted of a
terrorism offense, 34% of violent offense, 28.8% of a weapons offense, and
26.8% of a theft/other offense.58
C.

CONTROL VARIABLES

Demographic Characteristics. Four demographic characteristics were
included. As terrorist offenders have been identified as typically being older
than general offending populations and given that Diab has identified that
being younger serves as a potential mediating factor at sentencing, the
offender’s age was included.59 On average, offenders were 26 years old at
58

See Appendix 1 for the offense types for which terrorist offenders have been convicted
in Canada.
59
Diab, supra note 12, at 363. If the offender’s Age at sentencing was reported it was
coded as such. However, often the offender’s age was reported at the time of their arrest, but
no formal date of birth was reported. In these cases the offenders reported age was subtracted
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the time of their arrest. Similar to general offending populations, terrorist
offenders are predominantly male; however, in order to examine gender
diversity in convicted Canadian terrorist offenders, gender was coded as
“female offender” (0) or “male offender” (1). Only 8% of terrorist offenders
arrested, and eventually convicted, were female. A previous study
conducted by Johnson, Van Wingerden, and Nieuwbeerta, investigating the
sentencing outcomes of offenders adjudicated in a country not of their birth,
indicates that foreign offenders are sanctioned more harshly, and as such,
two variables were included to investigate the citizenship and place of birth
of the offenders.60 Together, 96.1% of the offenders were legal citizens of
Canada, and this factor was coded as “offender a legal citizen” (0),
“offender not a legal citizen” (1). Almost one-fifth of the offenders had
immigrated to Canada, as 19.6% of the offenders were recorded as being an
immigrant, which was coded as “not an immigrant” (0) or “immigrant” (1).
Offenders immigrated to Canada from 18 different countries, with the
greatest proportion emigrating from India.61
Extra-Legal and Legal Factors. In order to investigate changing legal
responses to terrorist offenders in Canada, four legal and extra-legal
variables are included. First, the amount of time an offender spent in pretrial custody was considered. On average offenders served 2.21 years prior
to being sentenced with a range of 1–6 years served. The amount of time
spent in pre-trial custody is measured as a count variable. Previous studies
have illustrated that, for both general and terrorist offenders, entering a
Guilty Plea can serve to reduce sentence severity.62 Just over one quarter of
the offenders entered a guilty plea (27.5%), and it was coded here as “no
guilty plea” (0) or “guilty plea” (1). In a recent study, Johnson reports that

from the year of arrest, onset etc. to approximate the offender’s date of birth.
60
Brian D. Johnson et al., Sentencing Homicide Offenders in the Netherlands: Offender,
Victim and Situational Influenced in Capital Punishment, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 981, 1002–03
(2010) (exploring the extent to which prosecutorial recommendations, victim/offender
relationships and extra-legal factors impact sentencing outcomes for a sample of homicide
offenders convicted in the Netherlands).
61
Offenders emigrated from: Afghanistan, Algeria, Armenia, Belgium, Egypt, Hungary,
India, Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lebanon, Morocco, Netherlands, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Syria.
62
See Bradley-Engen 2, supra note 54, at 848; Bradley-Engen 1, supra note 40, at 450–
51; Rodney L. Engen & Randy R. Gainey, Modeling the Effects of Legally Relevant and
Extralegal Factors Under Sentencing Guidelines: The Rules Have Changed, 38
CRIMINOLOGY 1207, 2019 (2000) (finding that offenders who plead guilty receive shorter
sentences even accounting for additional extra-legal factors).

4. AMIRAULT

790

4/6/2017 7:05 PM

AMIRAULT, BOUCHARD, FARRELL & ANDRESEN [Vol. 106

terrorist offenders who have an increased number of co-defendants are less
likely to go to trial and to be convicted. This in part may be attributed to the
fact that there is a dispersion of culpability among co-defendants and an
increased likelihood of plea negotiations.63 Approximately half of the
sample (48.7%) were tried with co-defendants, and this factor was coded as
“no co-defendants” (0) or ‘co-defendants’ (1). On average offenders had
9.02 co-Offenders, with a range of 0 to 23. The number of co-offenders is
also included as a count variable.
D.

ANALYTIC STRATEGY

In order to investigate how the sentencing outcomes of terrorist
offenders convicted in Canada have varied across time, the current study
utilizes time-series plots, bivariate analyses, and ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression. The structure of the data presented a challenge as the
convicted offenders were not only organized into three periods, but
members of the FLQ were further grouped among their co-offenders. This
created a differential structure within the data that was only characteristic of
the FLQ. While there was no appropriate way to recode the remaining cases
to control for their involvement with co-offenders, a null hierarchical linear
model was run using a period indicator to explore the potential necessity of
multilevel modeling. However, upon inspection it was found that the
intraclass correlation was not significant indicating that multilevel modeling
was not the best modeling strategy for the data.64 In order to explore the
effect of each group of covariates on sentencing outcomes, the variables
were first entered into independent regression models (demographic
characteristics, terrorism-specific, extra-legal and legal factors, and
sentencing context). A final model was then run, including all of the
covariates in order to explore any mediating effects.

63

Brian D. Johnson, Cross-Classified Multilevel Models: An Application to the Criminal
Case Processing of Indicted Terrorist Offenders, 28 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 163,
183 (2012).
64
See generally G. David Garson, Fundamentals of Hierarchical Linear and Multilevel
Modeling, in HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELING: GUIDE AND APPLICATIONS 3–26 (G. David
Garson ed., 2013) (presents an overview of the utility and structure of hierarchical linear
models).
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Table 1
Demographic Characteristics (n = 153)

Length of Period (In
Years)
Number of Offenders
Average Age of
Offenders
Male Offenders
Legal Citizens
Immigrants

Total Sample

Period 1

Period 2

Period 3

49

20

19

10

153

108

22

32

26 (18 – 61)

24 (18 – 48)

92.2%
96.1%
19.6%

91.7%
99.1%
1.9%

30 (21 – 59)
90.9%
90.9%
54.5%

31 (20 – 61)
95.7%
87%
65.2%

+

.28**
.15
-.17*
.16*
-.03
-.01
.003
-.23**
-.29**
-.39**
.31**
.20*
.06
-.11
-.04
.10
-.09
.02
.21**
.01
-.27**
-.69***
.36***
.53***
.36**

2.

3.

.29***
-.22**
-.03
-.32***
-.04
.05
.08
.16*
.21**
-.41***
.03

p<.10, *p < . 05, ** p < .01, ***p<.001

1. Age
2. Immigrant
3. Success
4. Death
5. Increased Threat
6. No Threat
7. Training
8. Guilty Plea
9. Co-Defendants
10. Co-Offenders
11. 1963 – 1982
12. 1983 – 2001
13. 2002 – 2010
14. FSM

1.

-.68**
-.2**
.19*
-.03
.29***
.39**
.23**
-.09
-.19*
.29**

4.

Table 2

-.54***
.005
.20*
.02
-.41**
-.26**
.18*
.16*
.07

5.

-.23**
-.23**
-.36***
.08
.09
-.13+
.01
-.44**

-

6.

.21**
.28**
.13
-.12
.02
.14+
.29**

7.

.10
-.12
-.34***
.17*
.27**
.31**

8.

-.007
.06
.23**
-.30***
.17*

9.

.41**
-.39**
-.14
-.09

10.

-.64***
-.65***
-.35**

11.

-.17*
.29**

12.

.15

13.

792

Bivariate Associations (n = 153)
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RESULTS

Table 1 provides descriptive information about the sample, while
Table 2 provides measures of association among the covariates. The key
finding throughout these analyses is that the periods are defined more by
their differences than by their similarities, and the observed differences
begin with the demographic characteristics of our offending sample. Over
time, the average age of offenders convicted of terrorist offenses has
increased as the lowest mean age was reported in Period 1 (M = 24), and the
highest mean age was reported in Period 3 (M = 31). Being older was
significantly associated with being an immigrant (Rho = .28, p < 0.01) and
participating in an incident that posed an increased threat (Rho = .16, p <
0.05). Collectively, offenders convicted of terrorist offenses have been
overwhelmingly male, and there has been little variability in the proportion
of female offenders over time. The greatest amount of variability in the
demographic characteristics across periods is evident in the number of
offenders who are legal citizens and immigrants to Canada. While legal
citizenship declines over time, the number of immigrants convicted of
terrorist offenses increases. Only two members (1.9%) of the FLQ were
immigrants; however, 54.5% of the offenders in Period 2 and 65.2% of the
offenders in Period 3 immigrated to Canada.
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Table 3
Terrorism Related Factors (n = 153)
Total Sample
1963 - 2010

Period 1
1963 - 1982

Period 2
1983 - 2001

(n = 153)

(n = 108)

(n = 22)

Period 3
2002 2011
(n = 23)

Offense Completed

79.1%

83.3%

100%

39.1%

Severity
Actions Resulted in Death
Increased Threat to Human Lives
No Threat to Human Lives

23.5%
60.1%
16.3%

29.6%
51.9%
18.5%

13.6%
81.8%
4.5%

4.3%
78.3%
17.4%

Motivation
Nationalism/Separatism
Islamic Extremism
Political1
Sikh Extremism
Personal2
Eco-Terrorism
Financial

70.6%
9.2%
11.1%
3.9%
2.6%
1.3%
.7%

100%
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
54.5%
22.7%
13.6%
9.1%
0

0
60.9%
21.7%
4.3%
8.7%
0
4.3%

49.7%
28.1%
15.7%
2.6%
3.9%

49.1%
30.6%
16.7%
.9%
2.8%

31.8%
45.5%
9.1%
0
13.6%

69.6%
0
17.4%
13%
0

96.7%
2.7%
.7%

98.1%
1.9%
0

95.5%
4.5%
0

91.3%
4.3%
4.3%

21.6%

18.5%

22.7%

34.8%

Weapon
Explosive Device
Firearm
No Weapon
Arson
Explosive Device/Firearm
Location of Offense
Canada
Other
No Specific Location Intended
Training Camp/Preparation
Offense Type
Terrorism
10.5%
69.6%
Violent
34%
39.8%
40.9%
0
Weapons
28.8%
31.5%
31.8%
13%
Theft/Other
26.8 %
28.7%
27.3%
17.4%
1
Political Motivations include: Protesting the Bosnian War; ASALA; Direct Action;
Israel/Palestine Conflict; LTTE; capitalism.
2
Personal Motivations include: Retaliation for grievance, protest of gun control laws, assistance of
family member.
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We found significant variability in the ability of terrorist offenders to
complete their offenses across periods. The offenders in Period 2 were all
able to complete their offenses, while 83.3% of the offenders in Period 1,
and only 39.1% in Period 3, were able to complete their offenses (See
Table 3).65 At the bivariate level, being able to complete an offense was
negatively associated with posing an increased threat (Phi = -.22, p < 0.01),
attending a training camp (Phi = -.32, p < 0.01) and being arrested in
Period 3 (Phi = - .41, p < 0.01), and was positively associated with causing
the death of a civilian (Phi = .29, p < 0.01), and being arrested in Period 1
(Phi = .16, p <0 .05) and 2 (Phi = .21, p < 0.01). In a similar vein, there is
an overall downward trend in the deaths of civilians over time as 29.6% of
the offenders in Period 1, 13.6% of the offenders in Period 2, and 4.3% of
the offenders in Period 3 were involved in an offense that resulted in the
death of a civilian. Conversely, there is a general upward trend in the
proportion of offenders who were involved in offenses that posed an
increased threat to human lives as 81.8% of offenders in Period 2, and
78.3% of offenders in Period 3 engaged in these types of activities.
In total, seven primary motivations were identified. Again, as all of the
offenders in Period 1 were participants in FLQ activity, 100% of the
offenders in this period were motivated by nationalism/separatism.
However, Period 2 saw a rise in terrorist incidents motivated by imported
grievances. Over half of the offenders in Period 2 (54.5%) were motivated
by political grievances composed of offenders participating in the Armenian
militant groups, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
(ASALA) and Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide
(JCAG)/Armenian Revolution Army (ARA). Also included in this period
are the members of Direct Action who were not motivated by an
overarching political ideology, but whose objective was to motivate others
to engage in political action through their militant actions. The second most
common motivation in Period 2 was Sikh extremism (22.7%), and includes
offenders who were involved in the attempted assassinations of Malkiat

65
Only four offenders plotted to commit, or committed, their offenses outside of Canada.
The two members of Period 1 were involved in a plot to bomb the Statue of Liberty.
FOURNIER, supra note 22, at 93. The one member of Period 2 was involved in an incident
that occurred while participating in the Bosnia War. R. v. Ribic (2008), 67 W.C.B. 2d 523
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). The one member of Period 3 was to provide the expertise necessary
to utilize remote detonators in a plot that was intended to be executed in the United
Kingdom. Mullins, supra note 4, at 736–37 (citing R. v. Khawaja, 2008 CarswllNat 675
(Can. Ont. Ct. J.)).
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Singh Sidhu and Tara Singh Hayer.66 The motivations change drastically in
Period 3, as over half of the offenders adjudicated were motivated by
Islamic Extremism (60.9%). In Period 3, political motivations included the
Israel/Palestine conflict, support for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,
and capitalism.
Offenders participated in training camps across all periods, as 18.5%
of offenders in Period 1, 22.7% of offenders in Period 2 and 34.8% of
offenders in Period 3 engaged in activities to prepare for their involvement
in terrorist events. Ironically, doing so does not facilitate offense
completion, as we find that attending a training camp is negatively
associated with being able to complete an offense (Phi = -.32, p < 0.01).
Only one offender (in Period 3) went abroad to attend a training camp that
was located in Pakistan.67 Finally, in both Periods 1 (39.8%) and 2 (40.9%),
offenders were most commonly convicted of violent related offenses.
However, following the criminalization of terrorism-specific offenses in
Period 3, no offenders were convicted of violent offenses, while 69.6%
were convicted of terrorism-specific offenses. This finding highlights the
criminal justice system’s active use of these new legal provisions and the
use of terrorism-specific offenses in place of violent offenses.

66

As noted above, Inderjit Singh Reyat (the only offender convicted in connection with
the Air India bombings) has been tried on four separate occasions for his involvement in the
incident. As only his final trial is included here, he is a member of Period 3.
67
Only four offenders plotted to execute, or executed, their offenses outside of Canada.
The two members of Period 1 were involved in a plot to bomb the Statue of Liberty.
FOURNIER, supra note 2, at 93. The one member of Period 2 was involved in an incident that
occurred while participating in the Bosnia War. R. v. Ribic (2008), 67 W.C.B. 2d 523 (Can.
Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). The one member of Period 3 was to provide the expertise necessary to
utilize remote detonators in a plot that was intended to be executed in the United Kingdom.
Mullins, supra note 4, at 736–37 (citing R. v. Khawaj, (2008), CarswllNat 675, 737 (Can.
Ont. Ct. J.)).
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Table 4
Legal and Extra-Legal Factors (n = 153)

Time in Pre-Trial Custody
(in years)1
Guilty Plea
Co-Defendants

Number of Co-Offenders

Total Sample
1963 - 2010
(n = 153)

Period 1
1963 - 1982
(n = 108)

Period 2
1983 - 2001
(n = 22)

Period 3
2002 - 2010
(n = 23)

2.13 (1 – 6)

-

1.36 (1 – 6)

2.87 (1 – 5)

27.5%

17.6%

45.5%

56.5%

49%

50.9%

77.3%

13%

10.09
(0 – 23)

11.80
(0 – 23)

2.33
(0 – 4)

9.13
(0 - 17)

1

It was not possible to consistently identify the amount of time that members of the FLQ spent in
pre-trial custody and as such they have been excluded.

As for legal and extra-legal factors, note that, on average, offenders
sanctioned in Period 3 spent the longest time in pre-trial custody, averaging
2.87 years, which is more than double the average time spent by offenders
in Period 2 (See Table 4). The number of offenders who entered guilty
pleas increased over time as well. More than half of the offenders
sanctioned in Period 3 (56.5%) entered guilty pleas, while only 17.6% of
the offenders in Period 1 entered a guilty plea.
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Figure 1
Average Sentence Length and Number of
Terrorist Offenders in Canada
by Year of Arrest from 1963–2010
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Figure 1 illustrates the average sentencing outcomes and number of
offenders who were arrested from 1963 onwards. As a direct result of the
FLQ campaign, the greatest number of offenders were arrested in Period 1.
Yet, the average sentence length achieved in Period 1 (M = 66.23 months)
was the shortest among the three periods. Period 2 was characterized by the
highest average sentence length at 168 months, an average that decreased to
119 months in Period 3. At the bivariate level being arrested in Period 2
(Rho = .29, p < 0.01) was found to be significantly associated with an
increased sentence severity, while being arrested in Period 1 (Rho = -.35,
p < 0.01) was found to be significantly associated with a decreased sentence
severity. Furthermore, being an immigrant (Rho = .36, p < 0.01) and
attending a training camp (Rho = .29, p < 0.01) were also found to be
significantly associated with having an increased sentence severity.
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Figure 2
Average Sentence Length by Conviction Type and Period
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Figure 2 illustrates the average sentence length achieved by conviction
type and period. As terrorism-specific offenses were not criminalized until
2001, offenders sanctioned in Periods 1 and 2 could only be convicted of
general criminal code offenses. Breaking down the sentencing outcomes
achieved in Period 3 by conviction type helps to highlight the impact that
the criminalization of terrorism-specific offenses has had on sentencing
outcomes. In Period 3 offenders convicted solely of terrorism-specific
offenses were sanctioned 3.9 times more severely (M = 150.27 months)
than those who were convicted of a general Criminal Code offense alone
(M = 38 months). However, offenders who were convicted of both offense
types received the harshest penalties recording an average sentence length
of 161.40 months.
Given the impact of many of the covariates on sentence length at the
bivariate level, an OLS regression was employed to test the impact of the
covariates at the multivariate level (See Table 5).68 To begin, each group of
68

Due to methodological constraints, not all covariates could be included in the OLS
models. While it would have been desirable to include the offender’s motivation in the OLS
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covariates was entered into an independent model. In the first model testing
the impact of demographic characteristics, being an immigrant was found to
significantly increase sentence severity (b = 91.76; p < 0.01), while the
offender’s age was found to have no impact on sentencing outcomes. As
age, and in particular being younger, has been identified as a potential
mediating factor at sentencing, the fact that age did not emerge as a
significant predictor of sentence length may be attributable to the average
age of the sample, which is higher than what has previously been reported
as the average age of terrorist offenders.69 Next, the terrorism-specific
factors were tested. When compared to offenders who participated in an
offense that resulted in the death of an individual, offenders who
participated in an offense that posed an increased threat (b = -36.62;
p < 0.05), and no threat (b = -86.08; p < 0.01) were both sanctioned less
severely. Furthermore, attending a training camp (b = 47.41; p < 0.05) was
found to be predictive of an increased sentence length. The only terrorism
factor found to be unrelated to sentence outcomes was whether or not the
offender was able to complete their offense.

models, potential multicollinearity issues and the small occurrence of some of the
motivations identified in the data presented challenges. Note, however, that the
Nationalism/Separatism motivation (FLQ) is already controlled for when including the
contextual indicator of Period 1, which is true but to a lesser extent when we introduce
controls for Period 2 (i.e., Political motivation) and Period 3 (i.e., Islamic extremism).
Furthermore, due to the high proportion of offenders who were legal citizens this factor
could not be entered into the model. Finally, it also would have been desirable to include the
conviction type that offenders were sanctioned of; however, terrorism-specific offenses were
only introduced in Period 3, which indirectly acts as an indicator for conviction type.
69
Diab, supra note 12 at 363; LaFree & Ackerman, supra note 19, at 352.
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Table 5
OLS Regression Testing the Impact of Offender Characteristics, Terrorism
Factors, Extra Legal and Legal Factors and Sentencing Context on
Sentencing Outcomes (n = 153)
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

b (SE)

b (SE)

b (SE)

b (SE)

b (SE)

Offender
Characteristics
Age
Immigrant

5.87 (30.14)

-10.86 (31.03)

91.76 (18.82)***

52.37 (23.87)*

Terrorism
Specific
Success

-1.72 (21.29)

12.61 (20.32)

a

Severity

Increased Threat
No Threat
Training Camp

-36.62 (19.14)*

-76.78 (20.37)***

-86.08 (25.52)**

-113.20 (25.01)***

47.17 (19.99)*

36.68 (19.13)*

Extra Legal and
Legal Factors
Guilty Plea

35.94 (17.05)*

6.20 (16.37)

Co-Defendants

17.86 (15.27)

-28.33 (16.34)+

Co-Offenders

-.98 (.89)

-1.26 (.95)

-72.78 (28.13)*

-58.00 (24.81)*

Disposition
Sentencing
Contextb
Offender Arrested
1983 – 2001
Offender Arrested
2002 - 2010
Adjusted R2

.14

.13

.07

101.77
(20.87)***
52.29
(20.49)*
.14

75.63 (26.30)**
14.16 (30.01)

+

p<.10, *p < . 05, ** p < .01, ***p<.001

a

Offenders who participated in an activity that resulted in death are used as the reference group for severity.

b

Offenders arrested between 1963 – 1982 used as the reference group for sentencing context.

.33

In order to control for the 12 offenders who were issued suspended
sentences or probation terms, we add one additional factor to the series of
extra-legal and legal factors in the multivariate model to control for the
disposition issued. Of the four extra-legal and legal factors tested, the only
factor to emerge as a significant predictor of increased sentence length was
entering a guilty plea (b = 35.94; p < 0.05). This finding is contrary to prior
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studies that have found that entering a guilty plea serves to reduce sentence
severity.70 However, given that previous studies have further reported that
terrorist offenders who have an increased number of co-offenders and who
are tried with co-defendants often are subject to decreased penalties,71 the
effect of entering a guilty plea found here might be the result of the
challenges the criminal justice system faces when prosecuting multiple
terrorist offenders at the same time, or of the courts acknowledging an
increased level of offender culpability. Lastly, when exploring the impact of
sentencing context on sentencing outcomes, the regression model provides
further support for findings that have already been uncovered in the
descriptive and bivariate analyses. Being sanctioned in Period 2
(b = 101.77; p < 0.05) and Period 3 (b = 52.29; p < 0.05) was predictive of
increased sentence outcomes compared to Period 1.
A final model was then run to explore any potential mediating effects
among the covariates. When controlling for all covariates, being an
immigrant (b = 52.37; p < 0.05), attending a training camp (b = 36.68;
p < 0.05), and being arrested in Period 2 (b = 75.63; p < 0.01), all remain
significant predictors of increased sentence length. Additionally, when
compared to offenders whose actions resulted in death, posing an increased
threat (b = -76.78; p < 0.01) and no threat to human lives (b = -113.20;
p < 0.01) continue to be predictive of a decreased sentence severity. The
impact of entering a guilty plea and being arrested in Period 3 are lost, but
the effect of being part of Period 2 on increased sentence lengths remains.
The final model highlights the importance of controlling for not only legal
and extra-legal factors but also demographic characteristics and terrorismspecific and contextual factors when investigating the sentencing outcomes
of terrorist offenders.

70

See Bradley-Engen 2, supra note 54, at 849; Bradley-Engen 1, supra note 40, at 450;
Engen & Gainey, supra note 62, at 1219.
71
Johnson, supra note 40, at 183.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The current study sought to investigate variability in the sentencing
outcomes of terrorist offenders adjudicated in Canada between 1963 and
2010. The findings indicate that offenders convicted of general Criminal
Code offenses were sanctioned more harshly than those convicted of
terrorism-specific offenses alone, and that the period in which offenders
were adjudicated significantly impacted sentencing outcomes. Further,
across the observation periods there was a visible shift not only in the
demographic characteristics of offenders prosecuted for terrorism-related
offenses, but also in the motivations of these offenders, their ability to
complete their offenses, and the severity of the crimes perpetrated.
Together, these findings highlight not only the changing nature of terrorist
offenses and offenders in Canada but also how changing criminal justice
responses have impacted both terrorist activity and the sentencing outcomes
of this unique offending population.
As noted by Charters, Leman-Langlois, & Brodeur and Crelinsten, and
further supported by the results reported here, imported grievances have
served as the motivation for many terrorist incidents perpetrated in
Canada.72 Across Periods 1, 2, and 3 the proportion of offenders who were
legal citizens of Canada declined by 12.1%, while the percentage of
individuals who were immigrants increased by 63.3%. As of 2011, 20.6%
of Canada’s total population was foreign born, and between 2006 and 2011,
almost 1.2 million people immigrated to Canada.73 Immigrants were shown
to receive longer sentences. This finding is consistent with what Johnson et
al. have previously reported in that foreign offenders who are convicted in a
country not of their birth are sanctioned more harshly.74 Given the small
sample size and the absence of a matching control group, this study cannot
provide the final word on whether these results reflect a systematic bias in
the sentencing of immigrants, or whether the acts committed by these
individuals were more serious overall. One potential hypothesis for this
observed disparity could be that offenders who emigrated to Canada,
especially those convicted in Period 3, participated in the purported “new
terrorism.” Under this model, terrorist action is intended to be as destructive
72

Charters 1, supra note 1, at 18; Crelinsten 1, supra note 1, at 17–22 (documenting
numerous cases of international terrorism); Leman-Langlois & Brodeur, supra note 4, at 127
(pointing out that terror occurring in Canada is usually aimed at other countries).
73
STATISTICS CANADA, IMMIGRATION AND ETHNOCULTURAL DIVERSITY IN CANADA 4
(2013) (identifying trends in Canadian immigration).
74
Johnson et al., supra note 60, at 1007.
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as possible, lacks a specific political objective, and is often motivated by
religious, as opposed to political, ideology.75 The effect of immigrant status
was mediated (though not completely) by the inclusion of severity and
contextual factors in our regression models. It is entirely possible that
additional controls for case and offender characteristics would have further
reduced the effect of immigration. While outside of the focus of this
specific study, this result clearly deserves more attention from scholars.
Another finding that deserves greater attention relates to the variation
in the ability of offenders to complete their offenses across periods. Over
80% of the offenders sanctioned in Period 1 and 100% of the offenders
sanctioned in Period 2 were able to complete their offenses. However,
following the perfect success rate recorded in Period 2, only 39.1% of
offenders sanctioned in Period 3 were able to complete their offenses. There
are different ways to interpret this result, depending on the role one
attributes to counter-terrorist measures in preventing the completion of
terrorist conspiracies. One plausible interpretation is that increased
resources invested in the detection and investigation of terrorism cases
following 9/11 prevented these events from happening. One of the key
objectives of the ATA was to provide law enforcement with the tools
necessary to proactively prevent terrorist incidents, while further
criminalizing many offenses that focus on the preparation of terrorist acts.76
This study, and the nature of the data it uses, is not designed to
systematically evaluate the effect of the ATA or specific counter-terrorism
measures. We can only raise potential scenarios, and establish some of the
research questions that should be tackled in future studies. One of these
questions is: Would all of the events prevented prior to their completion
have actually occurred without the intervention of law enforcement
agencies? Seen the other way, how many terrorist conspiracies dissolve
prior to their actualization without external intervention by law enforcement
agencies? If we work under the assumption that close to all of the prevented
events of Period 3 would have been completed without the additional
resources invested, the high prevention rate of Period 3 suggests a
diminished capacity for terrorist offenders to carry out their offenses in
contexts where law enforcement is provided with additional resources
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specifically designed to prevent to terrorist activity.
A similar emphasis on counter-terrorist measures was also found in
Period 1 as a response to the FLQ campaign. In 1964, the Combined AntiTerrorism Squad, which consisted of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP) and the Quebec Provincial Police, was implemented in Quebec as
a means to actively suppress FLQ activities.77 Additionally, as the FLQ
continued their campaign in May 1970, the RCMP established a new ‘G’
Division whose sole purpose was to address ‘separatist-terrorist’ activities
in Quebec.78 In fact, the only context in which specialized task forces or
legislations specifically implemented to prevent terrorist activity were not
operational was the 1983–2001 period where our data indicate that no
terrorist conspiracies were prevented by law enforcement agencies. The
absence of these specialized mechanisms in Period 2 was most likely the
result of there being no perceived need for additional measures during this
time period as no terrorist campaigns comparable to the FLQ’s activities
were being executed and 9/11 had yet to occur. As shown in Figure 2, the
rate of terrorist events in Period 2 was also slower than in other periods,
especially in the 1990s. In the end, at the very least, our data points to a
careful separation of completed versus non-completed events when
analyzing trends in terrorism in Canada. Research into the differences
between these conspiracies, the offenders who participate in them, and the
process that leads to detection is also needed.
The central focus of this study was on the variation in the sentencing
outcomes following the ATA. Results reveal the ATA appears to not only
have coincided with an increase in the number of terrorist plots that were
uncovered prior to their completion, but also with changes in the ways that
the criminal justice system processes terrorist offenders. Offenders
sanctioned in Periods 1 and 2 were most commonly convicted of violencerelated offenses. However, following the implementation of the ATA, none
of the offenders sanctioned in Period 3 were convicted of violence-related
offenses alone, and instead 69.6% of the offenders adjudicated in Period 3
were convicted of terrorism-related offenses. As such, in the years
following the implementation of the ATA the Canadian criminal justice
system has relied on terrorism-specific offenses when prosecuting terrorist
offenders. The availability of terrorism-specific offenses has resulted in a
decline in the use of violent offense classifications that, historically, were
77
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relied upon heavily when prosecuting terrorist offenders. Furthermore,
changing legal responses are also evident in the number of offenders who
entered a guilty plea, and the amount of time offenders spent in pre-trial
custody. Over half of the offenders in Period 3 pled guilty, yet despite this,
Period 3 is also characterized by the highest average time spent in pre-trial
custody. Increasingly, prosecutors are challenged by the necessity to
balance the interests of intelligence and evidence agencies when preparing
and trying cases. The difficulties that they face in doing this, and the delays
that result because of it, have led to terrorism cases being referred to as
“mega-trials.”79 This observed increase in the time spent in pre-trial custody
may be an unintended consequence of the ATA.
Finally, in line with Damphousse and Shields, we uncover that the
context that offenders were sanctioned in significantly impacts sentencing
outcomes.80 Across the three periods, offenders sanctioned in Period 2
received the longest average sentence lengths, while offenders sanctioned in
Period 1 received the shortest average sentence lengths. The observed
differences between Periods 1 and 2 is in part attributable to the differences
in the nature of the terrorist activities that were undertaken in the two time
periods. The FLQ rarely targeted civilian populations, and the actions that
they engaged in generally posed a lesser threat to human lives. As a result,
their offenses were more minor in nature, and accordingly the average
sentence lengths achieved in Period 1 reflect this. Conversely, the offenders
adjudicated in Period 2 engaged in actions that had the highest severity, and
accordingly posed the greatest threat to human lives. While the increase in
sentence lengths achieved in Period 2 may in part be the result of the high
success rate at which these offenders completed their offenses, it is also
reflective of the fact that these offenders engaged in more serious offenses.
The seriousness of offenses committed in Period 2 may also account for the
observed decrease in the average sentence outcome achieved in Period 3.
Both September 11 and the implementation of the ATA serve as important
contextual markers for Period 3, and while many of the offenders
adjudicated during this time period posed an increased threat to human
lives, in comparison to Period 2, offenders adjudicated in Period 3
perpetrated offenses that were less serious in nature.
Accordingly, Schmeiser’s (as cited by Roach) sentiment that, “the
ordinary criminal law adequately covers dangerous conduct by insurgents”
79
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is both confirmed and contradicted by the findings uncovered here.81 In
support of this perspective, across periods, the highest average sentence
lengths were achieved in Period 2, when offenders were prosecuted using
general Criminal Code provisions only. However, the results presented
throughout further indicate that the criminalization of terrorism-specific
offenses may provide legal measures that result in an increased number of
terrorist plots detected prior to completion. In this way, it appears that while
general Criminal Code provisions offer adequate resources to punish
terrorist offenders, the criminalization of terrorism-specific offenses may
facilitate the prevention of terrorist incidents. These can only be tentative
conclusions. The data did not provide us with an opportunity to investigate
the failed attempts that did not come to the attention of the police, nor did
our research design allow us to make strong conclusions on the impact of
the ATA on the success rates of terrorist offenders. Specialized legal
measures, and task forces, may not prevent terrorist offenses in all contexts,
and we hope that future studies can be framed to systematically test the
impact of counter-terrorism measures and legislations such as the ATA.
However, in line with the sentiments of Roach and Shaffer, the
evidence presented here also indicates that the implementation of these new
legal measures, and the threat of harsher punishments, have failed to act as
deterrents for offenders plotting large-scale terrorist incidents.82 This
finding is not particularly surprising given that deterrence is not an effective
mechanism for preventing crimes motivated by a political, religious or other
ideological goal.83 While LaFree and Hendrickson offer that the criminal
justice model of responding to terrorism acknowledges that terrorism can
never fully be eradicated, only controlled, states utilizing this model need to
ensure that they do not implement legal measures that infringe upon the
civil rights of their citizenry.84 In the wake of September 11, in addition to
criminalizing terrorism-specific offenses, Canada, and countries such as the
United Kingdom, implemented additional legal mechanisms designed to
proactively prevent terrorist incidents such as preventative detentions and
investigative hearings.85 While the use of these mechanisms in Canada has
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been infrequent, the indeterminate detention of non-citizens in the United
Kingdom was deemed to be a violation of the European Convention on
Human Rights in 2004.86 If it is true that terrorism can never be fully
eliminated, and only managed, then repressive measures alone will never
achieve the desired outcome of preventing all terrorist incidents. As such,
although challenging, the Canadian Government must work to achieve a
delicate balance between protecting the safety, and civil rights, of Canadian
citizens and it must resist the temptation to implement wide sweeping
repressive measures in the wake of terrorist incidents.
Although these findings provide important insight into the punishment
of terrorist offenders in Canada, some important limitations must be
addressed. When assessing the changing nature of terrorist incidents and
offenders, we do so only by examining offenders who have been officially
adjudicated. As previous studies investigating the prevalence of terrorism in
Canada have reported an average of 405 incidents, and the current study
only includes 153 offenders, our sample is inherently characterized by a
selection bias. Similarly, as sentence outcome was the key variable of
interest in these analyses, only offenders for whom this information could
be located were included in the data set. Consequently, not all offenders
who have perpetrated terrorist incidents are included here, and this is
especially true for historical cases such as those pertaining to the SOF
Doukhobors’ campaign. Open source information was used to code the data
utilized, and as such some important case details may be missing. Further,
given the historical nature of much of this data it was difficult to
consistently locate information pertaining to the number of counts offenders
were charged with and whether or not they were tried by a jury or a judge.
As such neither of these legal factors are controlled for. Finally, although it
is not possible to include a comparison group for offenders who were
convicted of terrorism-specific offenses, it would have been beneficial to
include a comparison group such that we could explore how, or if, the
sentencing outcomes of terrorist offenders differed from general offending
populations convicted of similar offenses during each of the time periods,
and to what extent being prosecuted under this label served as an
aggravating factor.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the findings presented in this study
provide much needed information not only about the sentencing outcomes
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of terrorist offenders prosecuted in Canada, but about the changing nature
of the offenders who perpetrate these offenses. Over time imported
grievances have become a key motivating factor for terrorist incidents, and
offenders who have immigrated to Canada are punished more severely than
those who were born in Canada. Following the implementation of the ATA,
the average sentence length of offenders convicted of terrorism-related
offenses has decreased; however, so too has the rate at which offenders are
able to successfully complete their offenses. Accordingly, the observed
decrease in the sentence outcomes of terrorist offenders prosecuted over the
past decade is perhaps better characterized by the relative success of law
enforcement in disrupting terrorist plots rather than by a failure in the new
legislation to achieve harsher punishment.
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APPENDIX 1. CODE OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
Terrorism
- Participation in a terrorist
group
- Providing or making
property or services
available to terrorist
purposes
- Training for terrorist
purposes
- Providing financial
services knowing that they
will benefit a terrorist
group
- Instructing others to
carry out activity for a
terrorist group
- Counseling to commit
fraud over $5000 for the
benefit of a terrorist group

Violent

- Facilitating terrorist
activity
- Commission of an offense
for a terrorist group

- First degree murder

- Capital murder

- Manslaughter

- Attempted murder

- Engaging in a hoax
regarding terrorist activity
- Attempting to participate
in terrorist activity

- Armed robbery

- Assault

- Recruiting others to
participate in terrorist group

Weapons
- Intending to cause an
explosion
- Activating an explosive
substance

- Importing firearms

- Possession of a weapon
for a dangerous purpose
- Possession of an
unregistered firearm
- Possession of explosives

- Making or having
possession of explosives
- Careless storage of
ammunition
- Using explosives with the
intent to cause property
damage

- Possession of an explosive
with intent to discharge

Theft/Other
- Possession of stolen
property over $200
- Threatening to murder an
internationally protected
person
- Auto theft

- Conspiracy
- Breach of recognizance
to keep the peace and be
on good behaviour
- Arson

-Breaking and entering

- Theft over $200

- Perjury

- Mischief

- Promotion of hatred

- Accessory after the fact

- Uttering threats

- Destruction of property

- Criminal negligence

- Obstruction of justice

- Intimidation

- Theft over $5000

- Kidnapping
- Contempt of court

- Being complicit in a
kidnapping
- Sedition

- Burglary

- Forcible confinement

- Attempted extortion

- Hostage taking

